

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 013129

R 200920Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1765

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY GABORONE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMCONSUL LUANDA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KINSHASA 2329

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDEV AO

SUBJECT: PROPOSED AID TO ANGOLAN REFUGEES

REF: KINSHASA 2128 (NOTAL) (B) LUANDA 274: (CL KINSHASA 2209

SUMMARY: CRASH US PROGRAM TO FACILITATE RETURN AND RE-SETTLEMENT ANGOLAN REFUGEES IS RECOMMENDED. GIVEN POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF MAJORITY OF REFUGEES WITH HOLDEN ROBERTO'S FNLA, WE COULD EXPECT PROGRAM TO SERVE POLITICAL ENDS AS WELL AS MEET BASIC HUMANITARIAN NEEDS. RESETTLEMENT ASPECTS SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, UNHCR AND VOLAGS. FACILITIES TO MOVE REFUGEES FROM ZAIRE, ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA SHOULD BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS CONCERNED IF THEY ARE INTERESTED. HOLDEN ROBERTO WOULD BE INTERESTED. END SUMMARY.

1. IT IS, I SUBMIT, IN THE US INTEREST TO HELP HOLDEN ROBERTO'S FNLA TO RETURN REFUGEES TO ANGOLA AS REAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD DO THIS WITH TWO PROGRAM: A BASIC PROGRAM FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN ANGOLA ITSELF BACKING UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND A SUPPLEMENTARY CRASH PROGRAM ESSENTIALLY AIMED AT

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HELPING HOLDEN BUT, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, OPEN TO

OTHERS AS WELL. THIS SECOND PROGRAM SHOULD INCLUDE CASH FOR AGREED PURPOSES, E.G., GASOLINE, RELATING TO REFUGEE MOVEMENTS FROM ZAIRE, VEHICLES - JEEPS AND TRUCKS INCLUDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, AND MEDICINES, E.G., CHOLERA SERUM.

2. THE HUMANITARIAN CASE FOR ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLAN REFUGEES HAS BEEN ADVANCED SEPARATELY AND IN ANY CASE IS EVIDENT (REFTEL C) HEREIN I ADDRESS THE POLITICS.

3. FIRST, WHILE WE HAVE LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH HOLDEN AND HOLDEN WITH US, HE HAS SAID HE GETS THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS. HE IS ATTACKED AS THE TOOL OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS BUT HAS NOT HAD ENOUGH ASSISTANCE TO MAKE IT WORTH HIS WHILE.

4. SECON, THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT OF HOLDEN'S ANTIPATHY TO AUGUSTINHO NETO AND TO THE PREDOMINANTLY SOVIET-BLOC BACKERS OF NETO'S MPLA.

5. THIRD, HAVING SEEN A FAIR AMOUNT OF HOLDEN, I AM CONVINCED THAT WHILE HE WILL ENDEAVOR TO MAINTAIN GOOD RLATIONS WITH MOBUTU, HE WILL BE HIS OWN MAN ONCE HE IS ESTABLISHED IN ANGOLA.

6. FOURTH, IF THERE ARE ELECTIONS IN ANGOLA, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO US THAT NETO NOT WIN. SAVIMBI MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE MORE VOTES THAN HOLDEN, BUT IT WOULD BE CRITICAL FOR THE FNLA TO COME IN AT LEAST SECOND.

7. FINALLY, THERE IS A DANGER THAT CERTAIN PORTUGUESE OFFICIALS IN ANGOLA WILL FAVOR NETO AS THEY HAVE IN THE PAST. INDEED, NOW THAT THE LEFTIST ELEMENTS IN THE MFA ARE MORE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN PORTUGUAL, ONE WONDERS IF THERE IS NOT EVEN A DANGER THAT A POTENTIALLY PRO-COMMUNIST PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WOULD ENDEAVOR TO ENGINEER AND SUPPORT A NETO COUP TO HOLD ANGOLA AS A DESPERATELY NEEDED BASE FOR  
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ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND AS A SOURCE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE.

8. ASSISTING THE RAPID RETURN OF REFUGEES IS A REASONABLE POLICY IN AND BY ITSELF. BUT IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF REFUGEES WHO RETURN FROM ZAIRE WILL VOTE FNLA. EVERY VOTE IS NEEDED TO HELP DEFEAT NETO. OF COURSE,IF, AS I THINK WE SHOULD, WE PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION TO THE FNLA TO ASSIST IN THE RETURN

OF REFUGEES, IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT SOME OF THESE VEHICLES WILL ALSO BE USED IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIS IS A RISK WE SHOULD ACCEPT.

9. I AM, OF COURSE, AWARE THAT THE CASE AGAINST OVERT SUPPORT TO ANY ONE GROUP IN ANGOLA IS A STRONG ONE. BUT THERE ARE, I SUBMIT, FAIRLY STRAIGHTFORWARD WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE RISKS. IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE WOULD NEED A SENSIBLE OVER-ALL PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT EMPHASIZING POSITIVE HUMANITARIAN GOALS. SECOND, WE SHOULD CLEARLY OFFER TWO PROGRAMS TO ASSIST THE REFUGEES: ONE IN ANGOLA BACKING UN EFFORTS AND ONE TO LIBERATION GROUPS, INCLUDING THE MPLA AND UNITA AS WELL AS THE FNLA, AND GOVERNMENTS (ZAIRE, ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA) WHO HAVE POLITICAL CONTROL OF REFUGEES PRESENTLY OUTSIDE OF ANGOLA. WORKING WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA, THE UNHCR AND PRIVATE GROUPS, SUCH AS CARITAS OR A COUNCIL OF PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN ANGOLA, WE SHOULD OFFER SUPPORT IN TERMS OF FINANCING, FOOD, TENTS, MEDICINES, LIGHT FARM TOOLS AND SEEDS TO HELP ESTABLISH RESETTLEMENT FACILITIES IN ANGOLA FOR REFUGEES EITHER FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY OR FROM THE FORESTS WHERE ALLEGEDLY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ANGOLANS HAVE LIVED DURING THE FIGHTING. (SEE REFTEL B) THIS PROGRAM SHOULD ESPECIALLY SPUR THE OTHER ACTORS TO GET MOVING SERIOUSLY AND PROVIDE FUNDING AND COMMODITIES (TITLE II).

10. SECOND, WE SHOULD PUBLICLY OFFER TO HELP REFUGEES WHO ARE NOW LIVING IN ZAIRE, ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA TO RETURN TO ANGOLA, EXPRESSING OUR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH ANY GOVERNMENT OR OAU-RECOGNIZED "LIBERATION GROUP" WILL TO COOPERATE WITH US.

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ACTION SS-25

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R 200940Z MAR 75  
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1766  
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMCONSUL LUANDA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KINSHASA 2329

EXDIS

ALTHOUGH THE UN MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN REPATRIATION FROM SENDING STATES IN TIMELY FASION, WE SHOULD OFFER TO COOPERATE WITH ANY UN REPATRIATION EFFORT THAT MIGHT BE MOUNTED. IT JUST SO HAPPENS THAT BY FAR THE GREATER NUMBER OF THESE REFUGEES ARE IN ZAIRE, PERHAPS 600 TO 700 THOUSAND CARRY FNLA IDENTIFICATION. IF THE FNLA AND THE GOZ RESPOND FAVORABLE TO SUCH AS US OFFER AND POLICY STATEMENT, AS I WOULD ANTICIPATE, WE WOULD BE IN BUSINESS. IF OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND GROUPS ALSO RESPOND, WE SHOULD HELP THEM ALSO IN PROPORTION TO THEIR LESSER NEEDS.

11. HOLDEN ROBERTO WANTS HELP (SEE KINSHASA 2128). IN ADDITION TO A CASH GRANT, BY FAR THE MOST EFFECTIVE HELP SINCE HE COULD THEN PROCURE FOOD, MEDICINES, AND TRANSPORT HIMSELF, THE MOST USEFUL ASSISTANCE TO HIM WOULD BE VEHICLES, MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE, AND CHOLERA SERUM.

12. SINCE MANY ANGOLANS IN ZAIRE ARE IMPORTANT TO THE ECONOMY, THERE IS SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AT SOME POINT THE GOZ MIGHT WISH TO RESTRAIN THE EXODUS  
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OF ANGOLANS. HOWEVER, I RECENTLY ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER BULA EXACTLY WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WAS REGARDING ANGOLAN REFUGEES AND WAS TOLD THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE CONSIDERED THAT THEY WERE FREE TO DO WHAT THEY WISHED, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NEITHER FORCE THEM TO RETURN NOR FORCE THEM TO STAY. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, BEFORE GOING TOO FAR TO TOUCH BASE WITH MOBUTU.

13. IT SEEMS TO ME ON THE BASIS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN ANGOLA (SEE SECTION 50 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974) AND THE ATTITUDE TOWARD EFUGEE PROBLEM OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DELEGATION WHICH VISITED KINSHASA IN FEBRUARY THAT A PROPERLY PRESENTED PROGRAM WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN CONGRESS AND BY THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. (CONSULTATION WITH COMMITTEE STAFF AND SENATOR KENNEDY MIGHT BE DESIRABLE.)

14. IN ADDITION TO AID CONTINGENCY FUNDS WHICH MIGHT BE DRAWN ON, I NOTE THAT SECTION 2 C OF THE MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1962 CONTAINS FOLLOWING AUTHORITY: "WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES IT TO BE IMPORTANT TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST, NOT EXCEEDING \$10,000,000 IN ANY FISCAL YEAR OF THE FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE FOR USE UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, MAY BE TRASFERRED TO, AND CONSOLIDATED WITH, FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS ACT IN ORDER TO MEET UNEXPECTED URGENT REFUGEE AND MIGRATION NEEDS."

15 I RECOMMEND THAT A POLITICAL DECISION BE MADE TO PROCEED AND THAT FOR STARTERS \$1 MILLION BE ALLOCATED FOR THIS PROGRAM. AID/W AND ORM SHOULD IMMEDIATELY EXPLORE POSSIBILITES TO PROCURE AND SHIP FIFTY JEEPS AND ONE HUNDRED TRUCKS TO MATADI FOR THE FNLA. THESE VEHICLES PRESUMABLY CAN MOST RAPIDLY BE OBTAINED FROM MILITARY STOCKS WITH AID FINANCING REPLACEMENTS. GIVEN THE TIMING FACTORS, WE ARE ALREADY LATE AND AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL DECISION SO TO PROCEED IS REQUIRED. I WOULD ALSO PROPOSE THAT AID MISSION DIRECTOR SPENCER BE PUT IN CHARGE OF  
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IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAM IN ZAIRE. HE IS BOTH HARD-DRIVING AND PORTUGUESE SPEAKER WHO, I AM CERTAIN, WOULD WORK WELL WITH HOLDEN AND HIS DESIGNEES IN MAKING PROGRAM WORK. WITH OK IN PRINCIPLE ON THIS BASIS, WE WILL PROCEED WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH HOLDEN, WITH MOBUTU, AND TO STAFF OUR HORRENDOUS DETAILS OF ACTUAL PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOP AGREED PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION. FOR THIS PHASE, TDY ASSISTANCE OF EXPERIENCED AID DISASTER RELIEF OFFICER WOULD BE REQUIRED. I REPEAT, HOWEVER, ESSENTIAL NEXT STEP IS POLITICAL DECISION TO HELP. THEREAFTER, AS IN ANY CRASH PROGRAM, DETAILS WILL BE WORKED OUT MORE OR LESS SATISFACTORILY.  
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## Message Attributes

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